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According to the model of HOEL (1991), a unilateral emissions abatement of a global 
pollutant leads to lower aggregated emissions in a game with a simultaneous decision 
protocol. Our experiment tests the Hoel model and examines the question of whether a leader 
can induce additional abatement of followers in a game with a mixed sequential-simultaneous 
decision protocol. Using an environment with a unique interior equilibrium, our experiments 
confirm the stylized outcomes of previous public good experiments. Changes in abatement 
and profits for the simultaneous decision protocol are in line with the theoretical predictions 
of the Hoel model albeit not significantly in every case. In the treatments with a mixed 
sequential-simultaneous decision protocol, during the first periods an abatement near social 
optimum is mostly chosen by the leader. However, in most cases the leader failed to induce 
cooperation, i.e. there are few followers who react cooperatively to the leader’s signal. High 
efforts by the leader and the cooperative followers are exploited by the majority of defective 
followers. 
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1.  Introduction 
Some of the most serious environmental problems can be characterized as international public 
good problems. The damage each country suffers depends on the aggregated emission of harm-
ful material and not (only) on local emissions. The most prominent example is the climate 
change expected from global CO2 emissions. It is not in the self interest of each individual 
country to abate the Pareto efficient amount of emissions, because parts of the total benefit 
generated by abatement cannot be internalised. Given this situation, environmental pressure 
groups often demand that local politicians take on a leading role and abate more emissions than 
is in the narrow self interest of the country. Obviously, they hope that “a good example” may 
encourage other countries to join the coalition of abating countries. 
In a seminal paper, HOEL  (1991) investigated the consequences of unilateral abatement, i.e. 
abatement of a single country (say country 1) above the equilibrium level, under the assump-
tion that all countries decide simultaneously and that all other countries behave fully rationally 
and selfishly. It turns out that unilateral abatement leads to a greater total emission reduction 
and increases total welfare if country 1 has the lowest marginal benefit from abatement.1 The 
assumption of selfish behavior of all countries except 1 rules out that “the good example” given 
by country 1 can infect other countries.2 However, politicians and environmental pressure 
groups often claim a leader role for their own country regarding climate change in order to 
overcome the social dilemma situation all countries are confronted with.3 Thus it remains an 
open question whether “leadership matters”. In this paper, we try to answer that question by 
testing the Hoel model experimentally. 
Whether abatement on the part of the leader has an influence on the behavior of the followers is 
analyzed in experiments by  VAN DER HEIJDEN/MOXNES (2000). However, there are some im-
portant differences between our design and the design chosen by  VAN DER HEIJDEN and MOX-
NES. In their experiments, subjects play a standard public bad game4 where both the equilib-
rium solution for the simultaneous and mixed sequential-simultaneous decision protocol and 
the Pareto efficient outcome have a boundary solution. Therefore, they do not really test the 
Hoel model, which has interior solutions and allows deviations from the equilibrium in two 
directions. In  VAN DER HEIJDEN/MOXNES (2000) the leader had a significant influence on the 
                                                 
1 HOEL also shows that this positive result no longer holds if the unilateral abatement is followed by international 
negotiations on emission reductions. Unilateral reductions weaken the position of the leading country. Conse-
quently, total emission reduction after international negotiations is lower in the case of ex ante reductions of the 
leading country compared to the case without unilateral abatement. We do not deal with negotiations on emission 
reduction in this paper but only look at decentralized decisions about abatement. 
2 HOEL explicitly points out that “I do not take up the question of whether such action from one country might lead 
to similar behavior from other countries” (p. 56). 
3 As an example we can quote the German Federal Minister for the Environment: “Germany remains the leader in 
international climate protection … And we have to maintain our leading position”. Federal Minister for the Envi-
ronment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (2002).  
4 See ANDREONI (1995) for a public bad game. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  2 
other subjects (followers). However, the influence of the leader on the followers is not strong 
enough to make leadership profitable for the leader. 
In order to test the Hoel model experimentally, two methodological questions have to be an-
swered. First, one has to decide how the experiment should be framed. Either subjects are con-
fronted with the game as it is without any reference to environmental problems, or they are told 
the cover story which fits the story the Hoel model tells us. We decided on the latter because 
we wanted to test if unilateral abatement of harmful material induces further activities. A fair 
test of the model should take into account that it is designed to deal with environmental prob-
lems. Second, one has to decide how to inform subjects. Once again, we decided to design the 
experiment analogously to the model. This means that we gave subjects all the information the 
agents in the model are assumed to have. Game theoretic models implicitly make very strong 
assumptions about what people know. Normally, not only the rules of the game but also the 
equilibrium solution and the consequences of all kinds of deviations from rational behavior are 
assumed to be common knowledge. To test the model fairly, we had to ensure that these 
knowledge pre-conditions were fulfilled. Because the game has complicated interior equilib-
rium solutions, we could not assume that subjects would be able to compute the prediction of 
game theory and the Pareto efficient solution in the lab during the experiment. We therefore 
decided to teach the subjects before the experiment and to demonstrate the prediction of game 
theory as well as the Pareto solution. One may argue that this can influence subjects. But if this 
is the case, agents in the Hoel model should be influenced in the same way because they pos-
sess the same information we gave our subjects. Not informing subjects fully would mean not 
testing the model but testing the ability of students to find rational strategies in complicated 
games. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is outlined and the parameters and 
functions used in the experiment are introduced.5 Section 3 describes the experimental design. 
The results are presented in section 4 and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The laboratory version of the Hoel model 
In the N-country version of the Hoel model, each country emits a global pollutant. Every coun-
try  i,  N i ,..., 1 = , chooses abatement  i X  and possesses benefit and cost functions  ( ) X Bi  and 
( ) i i X C  with  0
' > i B ,  0
' ' < i B ,  0
' > i C , and  0
' ' > i C . The sum of individual abatements is 
￿ = =
N
i i X X
1 . 
In the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game with a simultaneous decision protocol, country  i 
abates to the amount at which private marginal benefit equals marginal costs, i.e. 
( ) ( ) i i i X C X B
' ' =                     (1). 
                                                 
5 A more complete version of the model can be found in appendix 1. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  3 
In the Pareto optimum (PO), aggregated abatement is chosen such that social marginal benefit 
equals marginal costs, i.e. 
( ) ( ) i i X C X B
' ' =   with  ( ) ￿ = =
N
i i B X B
1
' '             (2). 
Because social marginal benefit is above private marginal benefit, NE abatement is smaller 
than PO abatement, i.e. 
NE PO X X > . 
In order to model unilateral abatement of country 1, HOEL assumes that this country derives 
some kind of extra marginal benefit from total abatements, measured by a parameter h. It is not 
important where this benefit comes from. It may be the case that the inhabitants of this country 
have altruistic preferences or just love to see a “cleaner” world. For country 1, the total benefit 
from abatement then is 
( ) hX X B + 1   with  0 > h                   (3). 
Given (3), in the new NE for the simultaneous decision protocol it holds that 




1 X C h X B = +   and  ( ) ( ) j j j X C X B
' ' =   with  N j ,..., 2 =       (4). 
The standard case (1) is contained in this formulation with h = 0. HOEL shows that, in the equi-
librium described by (4), country 1 abates more and countries 2, …, N abate less than in the 
equilibrium given by (1) and that total abatements are greater in the case of unilateral abate-
ment. He also shows that, under unilateral abatement, 
' '
1 j B B £  for all 2, …, N is a sufficient 
condition for an increase of total welfare. 
We are seeking an answer to the question of whether “leadership”, i.e. the pure timing of ac-
tion, matters. Therefore, we have to analyze the implications of a change in the timing of action 
from a simultaneous decision protocol to a mixed sequential-simultaneous (in the following 
“sequential”) decision protocol, i.e. country 1 decides first, the other countries are informed of 
this decision, and then decide simultaneously on their emission reduction. Although the cost 
and benefit functions remain unchanged, the variation from the simultaneous to the sequential 
decision protocol alters the game theoretical prediction for individual behavior. Country 1, the 
leader, now has a strategic advantage because it may choose the point on the best response 
function of the followers which maximizes its own profit. In the subgame perfect equilibrium 
(SPE) of the sequential game, country 1 abates less and country j abates more than in the NE of 
the simultaneous game.6 Aggregated abatement in SPE is lower than in NE, i.e. leadership gen-
erates a negative environmental effect. 
In order to test the model experimentally, the cost and benefit functions have to be specified. 
Table 1 shows the specification of the model, and in appendix 1 we derive the appropriate NE, 
SPE, and PO solution. 
 
                                                 
6 See appendix 1. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  4 
Table 1: Cost and benefit functions 
 
Cost function of country i, i = 1, …, N  ( ) T cX X C i i i + =
2  
Benefit function of country 1  ( ) ( ) hX X AX b X B + - =
2
1 5 . 0  
Benefit function of country j = 2, …, N  ( )
2 5 . 0 X AX X B j - =  
 
To test the Hoel model and the influence of leadership, we use a 2x2 factorial design varying 
the sequence of moves and the parameter h. In the simultaneous treatments (sim), all countries 
simultaneously decide on their abatement. In the sequential treatments (seq), country 1 decides 
first, the other countries are informed of this decision, and then simultaneously decide on their 
emission reduction. The variation of h in the simultaneous case is a direct test of the model. 
Table 2 summarizes the treatments. 
Table 2: Experimental treatments 
 
variable    sequence 
    sim  seq 
h = 0  treatment T I (h = 0, sim)  treatment T III (h = 0, seq) 
parameter h 
h > 0  treatment T II (h > 0, sim)  treatment T IV (h > 0, seq) 
 
To implement the four treatments, we had to specify the parameters of the functions in table 1 
in a way that ensures that the payoff functions are sufficiently steep.  Table 3 summarizes the 
parameter values for T I - T IV and the abatements and payoffs subjects realize in NE, SPE, 
and PO. The parameters are chosen so that the NE has a solution in integers; numbers had to be 
rounded for the SPE and PO solution.7 
                                                 
7 Subjects had to enter integers in the simultaneous treatments. We allowed for one decimal place in the sequential 
treatments. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  5 
Table 3: Summary of parameters, abatements, profits, and payments 
 
T I and T III: b = 30/47, h = 0, A = 500, c = 3, T = 40,000, N = 5 
  Nash equilibrium
2  Subgame perfect equilibrium
3  Pareto optimum 
Country  1  2, …, 5  all  1  2, …, 5  all  1  2, …, 5  all 
Abatement  30  47  218  18.44  48.16  211.07  79.45  397.23 
Profits (Labdollar)  11,707  38,611  166,151  12,123  36,212  156,971  17,488  60,782  260,606 
Payments
1 (EUR)  15.00  21.70    15.10  21.10    16.40  27.20   
T II and T IV: b = 30/47, h =3000/47, A = 500, c = 3, T = 40,000, N = 5 
  Nash equilibrium
2  Subgame perfect equilibrium
3  Pareto optimum 
Country  1  2, …, 5  all  1  2, …, 5  all  1  2, …, 5  all 
Abatement  40  46  224  24.59  47.54  214.75  81.63  408.16 
Profits (Labdollar)  24,974  40,564  187,230  25,713  37,619  176,188  43,200  60,788  286,312 
Payments
1 (EUR)  18.30  22.20    18.50  21.50    22.80  27.20   
 
1  40,000 Labdollars = 1 EUR; payments include 12 EUR show-up fee 
 
2  simultaneous decision protocol 
 
3  mixed sequential-simultaneous decision protocol 
 
 
The efficiency loss in the NE and the SPE is considerable in all treatments. For h = 0, the profit 
for country 1 in PO is 49% (44%) above the profit in NE (SPE). The profit for country j in PO 
is 57% (68%) above the profit in NE (SPE). For h > 0, the profit for country 1 in PO is 73% 
(68%) above the profit in NE (SPE). The profit for country j in PO is 50% (62%) above the 
profit in NE (SPE). Free rider incentives are also considerable. If all other countries choose 
their PO abatement in T I, country 1 (j) can increase its profit by 72% (16%) compared to PO 
profit providing it chooses its best response. In T II and the same situation, country 1 (j) can 
increase its profit by 24% (16%). If all other countries choose their PO abatement, country j 
can increase its profit in T III (T IV) by 16% (19%) compared to PO profit providing it chooses 
its best response.8 
Given this version of the Hoel model, we can now formulate the two central hypotheses which 
follow from standard game theory and which will be checked experimentally. 
Hypothesis 1: 
Parameter h has a significant influence on the abatement and profit of country i both in the si-
multaneous and sequential treatments. A higher abatement for country 1 and lower abatements 
for country j = 2, …, 5 should be observed in T II and IV (h > 0) than in T I and III (h = 0).9 At 
the aggregated level, a positive environmental effect should be observed in T II and IV       (h > 
0) compared to T I and III ( 0 = h ), i.e. aggregated abatement is higher for h > 0 than for   h = 0. 
The change in abatement leads to higher individual profits for every country (and higher aggre-
gated profit) for h > 0 compared to h = 0.10 
                                                 
8 We assume that country 1 has no free rider option in the sequential treatments. 
9 However, the last part of the hypothesis is questionable due to the very small difference in NE and SPE abate-
ment of country j between treatments with h = 0 and h > 0 (table 3). 
10 At this point, we have to discriminate between the increase in profits and the positive welfare effect which 
HOEL describes in his model for the simultaneous game. The increase in profits is caused by a change in prefer-Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  6 
Hypothesis 2: 
The variable sequence has an influence on abatement both at the individual and the aggregated 
level. A lower abatement for country 1 and higher abatements for country j = 2, …, 5 should be 
observed in the sequential treatments (T III and IV) than in the simultaneous treatments (T I 
and II). At the aggregated level, a negative environmental effect should be observed in T III 
and IV compared to T I and II, i.e. aggregated abatement is lower for the game with leadership 
than for the game without leadership. Furthermore, the change in sequence leads to higher 
(lower) individual profits for country 1 (j) and lower aggregated profits for the game with lead-
ership compared to the game without leadership.11 
The most interesting point of hypothesis 2 is that the game theoretical prediction, that leader-
ship results in less abatement for country 1 and a world with less aggregated abatement, is in 
direct contrast to the above-mentioned idea that leadership may be a solution to the social di-
lemma situation countries are confronted with. 
3.  Experimental design 
Each of the four treatments was played with six groups of five subjects. Thus, we have six in-
dependent observations for each cell of table 2 and 120 subjects participating in the experi-
ment. All subjects are economics undergraduate students familiar with fundamental game theo-
retic concepts. Each of the, in total, 24 groups played the game 10 times and subjects were in-
formed about the number of repetitions. The experiment was fully computerized12 and anony-
mous. The subjects were seated in soundproof booths and had no contact before, during, and 
after the experiment. We had eight sessions with three groups (15 subjects) playing the game in 
parallel. Each session lasted about one hour. 
The information to the subjects was organized as follows. During the experiment subjects were 
informed about their individual and aggregated abatement, the aggregated abatement of all 
other countries, the individual profits of all countries, and the aggregated profit for all expired 
periods. The subjects received written instructions about the rules of the game, their role (coun-
try 1 or country 2, …, 5), the parameters, and the functional forms.13 Furthermore, their com-
puters were equipped with a payoff simulator which had two elements.14 The first was the 
profit maximizing function.15 In the simultaneous treatments, each country could put in the 
expected abatement of the other countries and then its profit maximizing response was com-
                                                                                                                                                           
ences due to parameter h, which is an element of the real payoff function of country 1. The positive welfare effect 
assumes that country 1 voluntarily abates more than in the equilibrium and the resulting welfare loss is compen-
sated for by the gain of all other countries. 
11 Here the same problem as in footnote 10 appears. The difference in NE and SPE profits of country 1 between 
the simultaneous and sequential treatments is too small to get significant results (see table 3). 
12 We used Z-tree for programming. See FISCHBACHER (1999). 
13 See appendix 3 for the instructions. 
14 See appendix 2 for a screenshot of the payoff simulator. 
15 Instead of the term “best response” we use the term “profit maximizing response” because the latter is more 
neutral in our view. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  7 
puted. In the sequential treatments, country j used the same program as in the simultaneous 
treatment and country 1, the leader, could put in its own abatement and then the profit maxi-
mizing response of the other countries was computed. Additionally, the expected profit and 
total abatement were computed for both cases. The second element was the simulator, which 
subjects could use to evaluate the consequences of non-profit-maximizing actions. The subjects 
here could put in the expected abatement of the others and their own arbitrary abatement.16 The 
payoff simulator was identical for all subjects in a treatment and was visible both on the input 
and the output screen. Before the experiment started, questions were answered and all subjects 
played two test rounds against the computer. The subjects knew that in the test periods they 
were playing against four automated systems whose behavior would not change. 
As already mentioned in the introduction, we decided to use the frame also employed in the 
Hoel model and to inform subjects comprehensively. For this purpose, we invited the subjects 
to attend a separate lesson held before the experiment on the same day or a day before the ex-
periment was carried out. We conducted five identical lessons with 24 subjects each (one from 
each of the 24 groups). This procedure guaranteed the anonymity within the groups. At the be-
ginning of the lessons, subjects were told that they should imagine that they were the head of a 
delegation from their country at an international conference on emissions abatement of a global 
pollutant.17 Given all necessary information for their country (costs and benefits), they had to 
decide on the level of domestic abatement. Then the most important features of the decision 
situation were explained. We demonstrated the Nash equilibrium for the simultaneous game 
and the subgame perfect equilibrium for the sequential game. We showed that everybody was 
better off in the Pareto efficient solution but that there were strong incentives to deviate from 
the efficient solution. At the end of the lecture, the input screen, the output screen, and the pay-
off simulator were shown and explained using an example. The lesson lasted about one hour. 
Subjects were informed that, in the experiment, countries would have different roles (country 1 
and the other countries). However, the information on which role each subject would play and 
the timing of action was first given in the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, sub-
jects received a show-up fee of 12 EUR and they were told that possible negative payoffs had 
to be settled using this fee. 
                                                 
16 Subjects who tried to maximize the collective profit given the expected abatement of the others could compute 
their “best response” with the help of the simulator. 
17 From the viewpoint of game theory, the frame of the decision problem is irrelevant for individual behavior. On 
the other hand, if we assume that people have “green preferences”, i.e. that they behave more cooperatively in a 
social dilemma with an environmental frame, our frame provides a “worst case” scenario for game theory. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  8 
4.  Results 
The payoffs per subject range from 14.40 EUR to 27.30 EUR including the show-up fee. The 
average payoff over all subjects is 22.10 EUR. Figures 1, 2, and 3 display the average abate-
ment over all ten rounds for country 1, the other countries j, and all countries. The PO, NE, and 
SPE values are marked. 
 
Figure 1: Abatement country 1
treatment
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Figure 2: Abatement country j
treatment












































Figure 3: Total abatement
treatment
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We summarize our findings with respect to the mean abatement (for country 1, j, and total) as 
follows: 
Observation 1: 
a.  The mean abatement of country 1 is ceteris paribus higher in the h > 0 treatments than 
in the h = 0 treatments. Abatement is higher in the sequential than in the simultaneous 
treatments. However, none of these differences between treatments is significant (exact 
two-sided MW-U test, 5% level). 
b.  The mean abatement for country j (j = 2, …, 5; in what follows abbreviated by country 
j) is higher in the sequential treatments than in the simultaneous treatments. As for Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  9 
country 1, no significant differences between treatments can be found (exact two-sided 
MW-U test, 5% level). 
c.  The remarkable difference between the mean abatement and the SPE value in the se-
quential treatments for both countries is significant for country 1 but not for country j 
(two-sided t-test, 3% level). 
d.  Total abatement is higher in the sequential treatments than in the simultaneous treat-
ments but the difference is not significant. The difference between total abatement and 
the SPE value in the sequential treatments is not significant (two-sided t-test, 5% level). 
 
The most striking observation is that country 1 does not reduce its abatement in the change 
from a simultaneous to a sequential decision protocol – as theory predicts – but raises its 
abatement. Due to the high variance of individual behavior, the difference between treatments 
is not significant. However, we still must reject the hypothesis that country 1 abates the SPE 
values in the sequential treatments. All in all, observations 1a-1c confirm the visual impression 
from figures 1 and 2 that, on the one hand, the behavior of country j does not vary much be-
tween the treatments but, on the other hand, the treatment variables h and sequence display a 
strong influence on the behavior of country 1. 
Although we have only 6 independent observations per cell in table 2, it is interesting to look at 
the correlation of the mean abatement of country 1 and j. Whereas the Spearman rank correla-
tion yields rS = .200 (p = .704) and .429 (p = .397) for the simultaneous treatments T I and II 
respectively, values of rS = .986 (p = .000) and .783 (p = .066) are obtained for the sequential 
treatments T III and IV respectively, i.e. there is a strong positive correlation of leader’s and 
follower’s abatement in both sequential treatments. The simple linear regression in table 4 sup-
ports this result and yields a significantly positive coefficient for the sequential treatments. 
These results are an indication that (at least some) followers follow the leader’s example and 
that abatements of followers and leaders are positively correlated. 
Table 4: Regression analysis 
Model  aj = b0 + b1a1
 
 
  b0  p(b0)  b1  p(b1)  R2 
T I (h = 0, sim)  51.2  .001  .010  .928  .002 
T II (h > 0, sim)  24.9  .168  .552  .147  .446 
T III (h = 0, seq)  30.4  .001  .579  .000  .965 
T IV (h > 0, seq)  9.3  .527  .745  .024  .759 
aj (a1) is the mean abatement of country j (1) over rounds, N = 6 ind. obs.   
 
Figures 4-7 show the abatements in the four treatments round by round. 
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Figure 4: Abatement in T I (h=0, sim)
period
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Figure 5: Abatement in T III (h=0, seq)
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Figure 6: Abatement in T II (h>0, sim)
period

























Figure 7: Abatement in T IV (h>0, seq)
period



























The round-by-round analysis of the abatements confirms the findings of observation 1: 
Observation 2: 
a.  The hypothesis that the abatement of country 1 is equal to the NE/SPE value must be re-
jected in 13 of the 20 rounds of the sequential treatments (two-sided t-test, 5% level). 
The hypothesis cannot be rejected for any round of the simultaneous treatments. 
b.  The same hypothesis must be rejected in only eight of the 40 rounds of all treatments for 
country  j . With one exception, all cases appear in the first four rounds (two-sided t-
test, 5% level). 
c.  The hypothesis that abatements for country j are equal to the PO level must be rejected 
in all 20 rounds of the simultaneous treatments and in 11 of the 20 rounds of the se-
quential treatments. The same hypothesis must be rejected for country 1 in 19 of the 20 
rounds of the simultaneous treatments and in only 3 of the 20 rounds of the sequential 
treatments (two-sided t-test, 1% level). 
 
The overall impression from figures 4-7 is that subjects show a clear tendency towards the 
equilibrium strategy during the course of the game and that this tendency is more pronounced Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  11 
in the simultaneous treatments compared to the sequential treatments. In the sequential treat-
ments, the downward trend to the SPE is interrupted by phases of constant and even increasing 
abatement, especially for country 1. In order to gain more insight into the way subjects adjust 




















= a  
as a simple measure of the deviation of individual behavior from individual rationality.  i t X ,  is 
the individual abatement of country i in period t, 
Eq
i t X ,  is i’s individual equilibrium (NE or SPE) 
abatement in period t and 
PO
i t X ,  is i’s individual PO abatement in period t. Coefficient at meas-
ures the mean absolute value of the deviation of individual abatement from equilibrium abate-
ment as a fraction of the difference between equilibrium and PO abatement, i.e. at summarizes 
the information about individual abatement behavior in figure 4-7. We observe at = 0 (1) for 
country 1 or j if all countries of this type play their equilibrium (PO) abatement. 
 
Figure 8: Alpha for country 1
period












Figure 9: Alpha for country j
period













  T I (h = 0, sim)  T II (h > 0, sim)  T III (h = 0, seq)  T IV (h > 0, seq)   
 
As expected, the at values in figure 8 and 9 decrease, although not monotonically. At first 
glance we observe that the at values are higher for the sequential treatments than for the simul-
taneous treatments for both countries over almost all rounds. The similarity between the at val-
ues for the simultaneous treatments, on the one hand, and for the sequential treatments, on the 
other hand, is striking.18 Furthermore, the decrease in the at values seems to be sharper for 
country 1 than for country j. Because the NE and SPE are not at a boundary, at measures de-
partures from NE and SPE behavior in both directions. Abatements below the NE or SPE level 
may therefore serve as a means of punishing subjects who behave selfishly. In order to analyze 
the structure of the deviations from NE and SPE behavior, we classified the individual deci-
                                                 
18 However, significant differences can only be observed for few periods. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  12 
sions of country j into three groups: cooperative behavior, best response or NE/SPE behavior, 
and abatements that are below the best response or NE/SPE.19 The corresponding intervals are 
described at the bottom of figures 10-13, which show the fractions of the three behavioral pat-
terns for each treatment. 
 
Figure 10: Individual behavior of country j
T I (h=0, sim)
period






































Figure 11: Individual behavior of country j
T III (h=0, seq)
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Figure 12: Individual behavior of country j
T II (h>0, sim)
period






































Figure 13: Individual behavior of country j
T IV (h>0, seq)
period







































    Cooperative behavior, i.e. abatement between max (bR, Eq) and PO. 
   Abatement between min (bR, Eq) and max (bR, Eq) with “bR” as individual best response to the 
aggregated abatement of the others in the current period and “Eq” as individual abatement in NE or 
SPE (with +/- 20%). 
Abatement below min (bR, Eq).   
 
A significant fraction of abatement decisions of country j are below the best response level, and 
in all treatments the proportion of this kind of deviation from individual rational behavior in-
creases during the game. This may be interpreted as a sign of the existence of some punishment 
behavior or negative reciprocity shown by the subjects in the role of country j. Note that par-
ticularly in the sequential treatments there are at least some subjects in the role of country j 
                                                 
19 As punishment behavior of country 1 is extremely rare (we observe it in 5 of 240 cases) we only consider coun-
try j here. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  13 
who show an increasing tendency to abate below the best response level. This may be a reac-
tion of these subjects to the frustrating experience made in the early rounds that the high 
abatement of country 1 does not motivate the other countries j to follow suit. Furthermore, fig-
ures 10-13 confirm the finding that cooperative behavior (of country  j) is stable more fre-
quently and for longer in the sequential treatments than in the simultaneous treatments. 
Figures 14-16 show the average profits earned by the subjects. These profits are not identical to 
the welfare measure used in the Hoel model because there the “extra profit” country 1 derives 
from abatements above the Nash level (measured by h) is not part of the welfare of country 1. 
The positive welfare effect of “over-abating” of country 1 results because the welfare loss suf-
fered by this country is overcompensated for by the welfare gains of the other countries. 
 
Figure 14: Profit for country 1
treatment
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Figure 15: Profit for country j
treatment
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Figure 16: Total profit
treatment
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We summarize our findings concerning the profits in the following. 
Observation 3: 
a.  Country 1 earns a significantly higher profit in the h > 0 treatments than in the h = 0 
treatments (MW-U test, two-sided, 1% level). But, comparing the sequential with the 
simultaneous treatments, it turns out that country 1 is unable to increase its profits by 
using leadership. Although abatement behavior with leadership differs a lot from that Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  14 
without leadership, there is no significant difference between the respective profits 
(MW-U test, two-sided, 5% level). The hypothesis that the profit of country 1 is equal to 
the NE or SPE value cannot be rejected  for all treatments (two-sided t-test, 5% level). 
b.  Country j is able to increase its profits above the NE or SPE value in all treatments. 
The difference is particularly high although not significant in the sequential treatments 
(two-sided t-test, 5% level). 
c.  Total profit is slightly above the NE or SPE value in all treatments. The difference is 
particularly high although not significant in the sequential treatments (two-sided t-test, 
5% level). 
5.  Discussion 
Our data support the Hoel model for the treatments with a simultaneous decision protocol at 
least for the second half of the 10 rounds. Therefore, it seems fair to state that the Hoel model 
describes actual behavior surprisingly well, i.e. we may confirm hypothesis 1, in an environ-
ment where subjects act simultaneously. On the other hand, our findings for the simultaneous 
treatments are in line with the stylized facts of many public good experiments: abatement starts 
between the NE and PO level, decays during the course of the game, and then displays a final-
round effect. BROSIG ET AL. (2003) have shown that, in standard public good games, subjects 
try to coordinate their behavior in order to realize the efficient outcome but that this coordina-
tion is only successful if all subjects stick to their promise to cooperate. Normally, this is not 
the case and cooperation breaks down after a few periods. This line of reasoning seems to be in 
line with our observations. 
The most important question we sought to answer with this experiment was whether or not 
“leadership matters”. Having a leader may open a way to solving the coordination problem just 
mentioned. If the leader starts each round with the PO abatement, this could serve as a kind of 
focal point for the followers. Our data show that this does not happen in the sequential treat-
ments, although the variance of individual behavior is large and this results in only a few sig-
nificant results. In most groups (10 of 12) of the sequential treatments, we observe a similar 
pattern of leader behavior.20 Country 1 tries to be a real leader and to present a “good exam-
ple”, i.e. its abatement is equal to or near the social optimum. The reaction of the followers is 
mixed. There are some groups (3 of 12) which succeed in abating at the PO level from the first 
round to the second-last. One of these groups even plays PO in the last round. However, in 
most cases (7 of 12) the leader fails to induce cooperation, i.e. in these groups there are few 
followers who react cooperatively to the leader’s signal. High efforts by the leader and the co-
operative followers are exploited by the majority of defective followers. This behavioral pat-
tern is the explanation for the fact that the mean profit of country 1 does not exceed the SPE 
values in the sequential treatments although the mean abatement of country 1 is significantly 
                                                 
20 In 2 of 12 groups we observe SPE behavior in both the leader and the followers. Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  15 
higher than the SPE values and that the mean profit of country j exceeds the SPE values in the 
sequential treatments. Based on these observations, we must reject hypothesis 2, but otherwise 
our data do not support the idea that leadership is an effective means to create stable coopera-
tion. 
6.  Conclusion 
The primary objective of our experiment was to test the Hoel model and to analyze the influ-
ence of leadership. Since the external validity of results gained in singular laboratory experi-
ments is restricted to the specific laboratory environment, we have to admit that we are not able 
to give any recommendations for environmental policy purposes. However, we may come to 
the conclusion based on our results that, firstly, the Hoel model describes the individual behav-
ior surprisingly well in an environment with a simultaneous decision protocol and, secondly, 
leadership matters a lot but is not able to increase the profit of the leader and to overcome the 
social dilemma situation all countries are confronted with. Only the followers who free ride at 
the expense of the leader and the cooperative followers in cooperative groups can increase their 
profits. In particular, the experiments show that countries that want to increase their own profit 
and the total profit of the group with leadership should not put too much hope in the effect of 
their good example. Even if some follow this example, the probability that other followers free 
ride and cooperation breaks down very soon is high. All in all, leadership does not seem to be 
an appropriate tool to overcome social dilemma problems, even if leaders have a strong incen-
tive to induce cooperative behavior. 
 Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  16 
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Appendix 1 
In this appendix we derive the solutions for the Nash equilibrium for the simultaneous decision 
protocol, the subgame perfect equilibrium for the mixed sequential-simultaneous decision pro-
tocol, and the Pareto optimal solution based on the specification used in the experiment. 
Nash equilibrium (NE) for the simultaneous decision protocol 
Country 1 maximizes the difference between benefit and costs of abatement given the abate-
ment of all other countries, i.e. 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) T cX X X h X X X X A b
X




1 1 1 1 1 5 . 0 max
1
p  
with  ￿ = - =
N
j j X X
2 1                   (A1). 
The reaction function of country 1 is 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 2
1
- - - +
+
= bX h bA
b c
X R                 (A2). 
Since all other countries ( N j ,..., 2 = ) are identical in their benefit and cost functions, we can 
substitute abatement  1 - X  by  ( ) j X N X 1 1 - = - . The reaction function  





1 - - +
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=               (A3) 
describes the best response of country 1 to the abatement chosen by country j,  j X . 
Country j,  N j ,..., 2 = , maximizes the difference between benefit and costs of abatement given 
the abatement of all other countries, i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( ) T cX X X X X A j j j j j j X j
+ - + - + = - -
2 2 5 . 0 maxp   with  ￿ „ - =
N
j i i j X X   (A4). 
The reaction function of j is 
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Since country j and all other  2 - N  countries  k ,  1 „ ￿ „ k j k , have identical benefit and cost 
functions, we can substitute abatement  j X-  by  ( ) 1 2 X X N X j j + - = - . The reaction function of 
j, 
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describes the best response of country j to the abatement of country 1,  1 X . The NE for the si-
multaneous decision protocol results as the intersection of the reaction functions (A3) and (A6), 
and the interior solution for the NE is 
( )
( )
2 1 4 1 2 2
2 1 2
c c N cb
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=           (A8). 
For  1 < b  and a sufficiently small h, we have 
NE
j
NE X X < 1 , i.e. the country with the smaller 
marginal benefit from abatement (here country 1) abates less than all other countries in NE.  
We are interested in analyzing the effects of a marginal increase in h. It is easy to show that the 
results of the general model hold for our specification, i.e.  0 1 > ¶ ¶ h X
NE ,  0 < ¶ ¶ h X
NE
j , and 
0 > ¶ ¶ h X
NE . For profits, we can show that  0 1 > ¶ ¶ h
NE p ,  0 > ¶ ¶ h
NE
j p , and  0 > ¶ ¶ h
NE p , 
i.e. payoffs increase with a marginal increase in h, which is an element of the real payoff func-
tion of country 1 here. This effect is independent of the relative size of the marginal benefit of 
country 1. 
Subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) for the mixed sequential-simultaneous decision protocol 
Country 1 maximizes the difference between benefit and costs of abatement given the knowl-
edge that the N-1 other countries will behave according to their best response function (A6) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) T cX X R N X h X R N X X R N X A b j j j
X




1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 . 0 1 max
1
p
                        (A9), 
i.e. country 1 can use its first mover advantage by choosing a point on the follower’s best re-
sponse function which maximizes its profit by backward induction. The solution for the sub-
game perfect equilibrium is 
( )
( )
2 1 2 1 2
2 1 2
c N cb
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We can show that 




j X X > , and 
NE SPE X X < , i.e. the change from the simul-
taneous decision protocol to the mixed sequential-simultaneous decision protocol leads to a 
lower aggregated abatement. Regarding profits, the change from the simultaneous decision 
protocol to the mixed sequential-simultaneous decision protocol leads to a higher profit for 
country 1, a lower profit for country  j , and (for the chosen parameters) a lower aggregated 
profit. The influence of parameter h on abatements and profits is the same as in the simultane-
ous case. 
Pareto optimum (PO) 
In the Pareto optimal allocation, total profit from abatement is maximized, i.e. the global plan-
ner has the following optimization problem: 
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In the PO all countries adjust their marginal abatement costs to the marginal social benefit from 
abatement. Since all countries have the same marginal abatement costs,  i i cX C 2
' = , in the PO 
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It is easy to show that 
NE PO X X >  holds. For abatement, it follows that  0 > ¶ ¶ h X
PO
i  and 
0 > ¶ ¶ h X
PO . For profits, we can show that  0 1 > ¶ ¶ h
PO p ,  0 > ¶ ¶ h
PO
j p , and therefore 
0 > ¶ ¶ h
PO p . Unilateral Emissions Abatement: An Experiment  20 
Appendix 2 
 
Screenshot: Payoff simulator (T I and II) 
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Appendix 3 
Instructions for T I ( 0 = h , sim). 
 
Instructions (Translation from German) 
 
Welcome to the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory MAXLAB! 
 
Please read the instructions carefully in the next 15 minutes. If you have any questions, please 
open the door behind you or give a sign. 
In this laboratory experiment, you can earn money depending on your decisions. Your earnings 
are computed in Labdollars (LD). The exchange rate between EUR and LD is 1:40,000, i.e. 
40,000 LD are equal to 1 EUR.  
After the experiment, your credit in LD will be converted into EUR and paid in cash. In addi-
tion to your earnings from the experiment, you have received a 12 EUR show-up fee before the 
experiment. 
You will make your decisions during the experiment anonymously. Only the experimenter 
knows your identity. He will keep your information in confidence. 
In the experiment, you are the representative of a country at an international environmental 
conference. You negotiate with representatives of other countries on the emissions abatement 
of a global pollutant. Five countries take part in the conference. Your are the representative of 
country 1. 
In each period, you have to decide on the abatement of your country 1, V1. 
The profit function of country 1 is 
 
















- - = . 
 
 
The profit maximizing response function (GMA) of country 1 is 
 












i 1 V V . 
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The simulator in the lower part of the screen will help you to make your decision. The simula-
tor assists in both computing the profit maximizing response for country i and simulating the 
effects of different abatement decisions on the profit of country i. The simulator is identical for 
all countries. 
The procedure: The experiment will be replicated ten times. A repetition is denoted as a period. 
In each period, you will make your decision under the same conditions. All countries decide 
simultaneously on their abatement V i, i.e. each country  i decides at the same time without 
knowing the decision of all other countries. 
The cumulated profit G1kum shows your current earnings from the experiment. After the last 
period, you will be paid your earnings in cash (G1kum divided by 40,000). If you make a loss 
(G1kum < 0), a message will appear that your show-up fee will be used to cover the loss. If your 
earnings are still negative after the last period, you will have to cover your loss with your 
show-up fee. The greatest possible loss cannot exceed your show-up fee of 12 EUR. 
Table 1 depicts abatement and profit for countries 1 to 5 in the Nash equilibrium and the social 
optimum (the row for your country is marked). 
 
Table 1: Nash equilibrium and social optimum 
  Nash equilibrium  Social optimum 
  Vi  Gi  Vi  Gi 
country 1  30  11,707  79  17,546 
country 2  47  38,611  79  60,765 
country 3  47  38,611  79  60,765 
country 4  47  38,611  79  60,765 
country 5  47  38,611  79  60,765 
sum  218  166,151  395  260,606 
 
Before the experiment starts, you will take part in a test phase which last 2 periods. In this test 
phase, you can familiarize yourself with the decision environment and the simulator. The only 
difference between the test phase and the experiment is that the representatives of the other 
countries are substituted by four computer agents in the test phase. The computer agents will 
make the same decision in both periods. The profits of the test phase are not relevant for your 
earnings in the experiment. After the test phase, the actual experiment starts. 
When you are familiar with the instructions and if you do not have any questions, please click 
on the “continue” button. The test phase will start in a few minutes. 
 
Good luck!  
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